[Midden-Oosten] Michael Karadjis on Trump, Biden, and the Syrian Revolution
Jeff
meisner op xs4all.nl
Ma Nov 2 19:15:11 CET 2020
Trump’s record on Syria: Enabler of Assad’s victory, enemy of Syrians
By Michael Karadjis
October 31, 2020
URL:
https://mkaradjis.com/2020/10/31/trumps-record-on-syria-enabler-of-assads-victory-enemy-of-syrians/
VERTAALD IN NEDERLANDS:
https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=en&tl=nl&u=https%3A%2F%2Fmkaradjis.com%2F2020%2F10%2F31%2Ftrumps-record-on-syria-enabler-of-assads-victory-enemy-of-syrians%2F
EXCERPT:
Trump’s record on Syria: Enabler of Assad’s victory, enemy of Syrians
90 percent of Assad’s Reconquista under Trump’s watch
By Michael Karadjis
October 31, 2020
With US elections approaching, Syrian people wanting to end the 50-year
tyranny of the Assad dynasty are looking for any light from either
candidate of the US ruling class. The fact that most conclude there is
little to be excited about, and search for the tiniest seeming advantage
from either side, highlights the plain fact that the US rulers have
never had any interest in supporting the Syrian struggle for freedom.
Now that Assad has largely won the so-called ‘civil war’ – mostly a
one-sided slaughter he waged against the Syrian people – the only real
debate going on is whether a victorious, yet highly unstable, Assad
regime can be pushed into some kind of political compromise via a
“constitutional commission” process.
Compared to the heady days of one of the vastest and most inspiring
popular revolutionary uprisings of the 21st century, having to ponder
such questions is dull indeed.
Nevertheless, reality being what it is, these questions can hardly be
avoided. Assad’s victory is no ordinary case of a dictatorship
successfully cracking down on its people, not wanting to underestimate
the terror involved even in such “simple” cases. In Syria, we need to
consider the whole Syrian people, not only those forced to live under
the dictatorship’s heel in the regions it controls.
Assad’s military victory: Counterrevolutionary stability or ongoing
catastrophe?
First, of Syria’s pre-war population of 23 million, there are 6.6
million refugees outside the country (of whom 3.6 million are in
neighbouring Turkey), over a quarter of the population, plus an equal
number internally displaced (IDPs) within Syria. Then there are over 5
million people living in the northwest (Idlib and northern Aleppo
regions) still outside of Assad’s control, under what remains of various
rebel groups, mostly under Turkish influence, and this includes over 1.7
million internally displaced from elsewhere in Syria. Then there are
another 3 million people, including 700,000 internally displaced, in the
northeast, under the control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF), backed by the US military, who entered Syria to help the SDF
defeat ISIS.
Therefore, some 14.5 million people – 63 percent of Syria’s pre-war
population – are outside regime control. When we add some 140,000 people
estimated to have been incarcerated in Assad’s torture prisons or
disappeared, of whom tens of thousands have been killed, and an
estimated 670,000 people killed in the war, along with the physical
destruction of much of Syria’s infrastructure by years of relentless
regime and Russian terror bombing, it becomes clear why Syrians are not
ready or able to say “OK, the dictatorship won, we lost, that’s bad, but
now there’s no choice but to get on with our lives under
counterrevolutionary stability” – any kind of “stability” is impossible
under such conditions.
At the very least, those pushing this view – not only Assadists, but
other well-meaning people who see the reality of defeat – need to take
into account that if it is the interests of “the Syrian people” they are
concerned about, then these “Syrian people” are not only the 8-9 million
under regime control (even if we assume that these people are content
with the situation, a likely erroneous assumption); but also the 6.6
million outside Syria, most of whom will not return with the regime in
power, and the 8 million living in the northwest and northeast outside
regime control.
For those concerned with ameliorating this situation, does a Trump or a
Biden in the White House make any difference?
Trump versus Biden?
Various articles indicate that among Syrian exiles in the United States,
there is little consensus, and this reflects the fact that the
differences are very narrow. This is hardly surprising; there is little
difference on many issues.
For example, Trump is clearly worse on Israel/Palestine, having
recognised occupied Jerusalem as Israel’s ‘capital”, put forward a
anti-peace process that gives everything to Israel, cut off funding to
UNWRA, recognised Israeli sovereignty over the illegally stolen Syrian
Golan and so on. Yet Biden and Harris are also extremely pro-Israel. No,
they may not have recognised Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and they
claim to support UN resolutions and the traditional, meaningless, “peace
process”, but Biden has also stated he will nevertheless not move the US
embassy back to Tel Aviv.
As the Trump and Biden camps are saying very little different in terms
of Syria policy going forward, much of the debate inevitably looks at
the records of the Obama administration (in which Biden was
vice-president) and the Trump administration. And neither offer any
inspiration whatsoever. Though my argument here is that Trump is worse,
it is understandable that some view Obama more negatively.
Obama’s support for the Syrian opposition was tepid at best; the CIA
program to train and equip “vetted” rebels was largely aimed at
co-opting and taming them, putting the CIA in a position to pressure
them to stop fighting Assad, and enlisting them for the “war on terror”
against ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra only (the Free Syrian Army – FSA –
already fought ISIS, and often Nusra, but resisted dropping the fight
against Assad). In other words, bringing real rebel formations around to
the same position as the concurrent Pentagon program, which explicitly
only armed ex-rebels to fight only ISIS or Nusra and not Assad – but
therefore had difficulty finding many real rebel forces to enlist!
Further, from 2012, the US placed spooks on the borders to ensure that
shoulder-held anti-aircraft weapons (manpads) – the defensive weaponry
most needed in a war of aerial slaughter – did not reach the FSA. Above
all, Syrians disapprove of Obama’s nuclear deal – the JCPOA – with Iran,
believing this encouraged Obama to turn a blind eye to massive Iranian
support to Assad.
Those viewing Biden as a better choice might note things such as Trump
ending all Obama-era assistance to the FSA and to Syrian civil society
organisations, Trump’s view that the only US fight in Syria is against
ISIS, the fact that 90 percent of Assad’s reconquest of much of Syria
took place under Trump’s watch, the gutting of the Geneva process, and
Trump’s overly friendly relationship with Russian Tsar Vladimir Putin,
Assad’s main backer. The strongly pro-Assad orientation of Trump’s
far-right base of support can also be noted. Trump also signed the ban
on travel and migration from seven Muslim countries, including Syria; as
Syrian-American Zaher Sahloul points out, “in 2020, fewer than 100
Syrian refugees were resettled in the U.S. compared with 12,500 in
2016.”
However, those who see Trump a better bet, regardless of his
motivations, point to things such as Trump’s anti-Iranian orientation
(including ripping up the nuclear deal), given Iran’s role as Assad’s
second main backer, Trump’s two pinprick strikes on Assadist facilities
to enforce the “red line” against Assad’s chemical warfare, which Obama
had not enforced in 2013, and the current harsh sanctions imposed on the
Assad regime in the post-reconquista phase.
This view, that opponents of Assad should wish for a Trump victory,
seems counterintuitive, given Trump’s initial declarations of support
for Assad and assurances that his administration was no longer focused
on removing Assad “like the previous administration was.” And the idea
that any degree of human liberation, in Syria or elsewhere, is more
easily achieved by having a far-right, white-supremacist in the White
House appears illogical.
But what if Trump’s greater tendency to enforce “red lines” leads him to
stumble, by accident, into ousting Assad, or if his anti-Iran policy
tipped the scales against Assad even if that were not the intention?
Syrians are as entitled as any other oppressed people to exploit the
contradictions among imperialist powers and reactionary states. It may
place their interests in opposition to those of virtually anyone else in
the world, from Palestinians to black and working-class Americans,
fighting for their liberation, but that is hardly the fault of Syrians;
rather, that would be the fault of those who have waged genocidal war
against them, or helped this by ignoring them, slandering them and
stabbing them in the back.
Nevertheless, this is a complete illusion. The interests of Syrians
fighting Assad are not in the slightest aided by supporting an enemy of
human liberation like Trump, neither on the Iran issue, not that of
‘red-lines’, nor on the issue of sanctions.
First let’s look at Trump’s record
In the lead-up to the 2016 US elections, Trump asserted that in Syria,
the US should be on the same side as Russia and Assad in “fighting
ISIS”, and said the US would cut off any meagre “support” still going to
the anti-Assad opposition under Obama.
Trump fulfilled his promise, fully ending the long-dormant CIA program
to arm and train some “vetted” rebels. While, as shown above, this
program was already tepid and ineffective, its continuation at some
level under Obama gave the FSA some room to manoeuvre and occasionally
take advantage of the arms, which was too much for Trump: in abolishing
it, he declared the program “dangerous and wasteful.”
With this cut-off of aid to the FSA, any US aid to Syrian “rebels” now
was only to those who do not rebel: US Central Command spokesman Major
Josh Jacques explained: “vetted Syrian opposition groups all swear an
oath to fight only ISIS.”
Trump also ended US “stabilisation” funding for civil society in regions
outside Assad regime control. Trump declared “the United States has
ended the ridiculous 230 Million Dollar yearly development payment to
Syria,” referring to the Obama-era funding for a vast array of
opposition local governance and civil society organisations, independent
media and education projects which kept society running in the regime’s
absence. The State Department explained that US assistance in northwest
Syria was being “freed up to provide potential increased support for
priorities in northeast Syria,” ie, to where the fight is only against
ISIS rather than the regime.
Thus Trump put an end to all US funding to both the civil and military
sides of the revolution.
From the start, Trump declared “We’re there for one reason: to get rid
of ISIS and to go home. We’re not there for any other reason.” His
secretary of state Rex Tillerson virtually declared Assad an ally: “We
call upon all parties, including the Syrian government and its allies,
Syrian opposition forces, and Coalition forces carrying out the battle
to defeat ISIS, to avoid conflict with one another and adhere to agreed
geographical boundaries for military de-confliction.” Assad’s future was
declared Russia’s issue, the US agnostic about “whether Assad goes or
stays.”
Tillerson’s speech in January 2018 focused on supporting the Geneva
process for a “political solution,” but the US no longer expected Assad
to stand down at the beginning of a transition phase as under early
Obama, or even at its end as under late Obama; rather, Tillerson claimed
that Assad could be voted out in a “free election,” which would
presumably occur with him in power, though the process may ‘take time”
for which he “urge(d) patience.”
Before Obama left office, Assad’s reconquest of opposition-controlled
regions had netted iconic democratic revolutionary centres south and
west of Damascus such as Darayya, Madaya and Zabadani, and East Aleppo
city in the north, by 2016. However, the fact that some 90 percent of
Assad’s Reconquista took place under Trump was not accidental or the
result of Trump’s alleged “isolationism”: it was based on US-Russia
agreement, the fruits of Trump’s pro-Putin politics. In mid-2017, a
“new” US strategy was presented by Defence Secretary James Mattis, State
Secretary Tillerson and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Joseph F. Dunford
Jr., conceding Assad’s control of Syria west of the Euphrates River and
most of centre and south. Discussing “a proposal that we’re working on
with the Russians,” Dunford noted “the Russians are as enthusiastic as
we are.”
How did that play out in different parts of Syria?.....
FULL ARTICLE:
https://mkaradjis.com/2020/10/31/trumps-record-on-syria-enabler-of-assads-victory-enemy-of-syrians/
Meer informatie over de Midden-Oosten
maillijst