[Midden-Oosten] Michael Karadjis 2/2 - The Turkish invasion: Latest step in the Russian-led destruction of the Syrian revolution

[Jeff]

Part 2
The Turkish invasion: Latest step in the Russian-led destruction of the 
Syrian revolution
By Michael Karadjis

https://mkaradjis.wordpress.com/2019/10/23/the-turkish-invasion-latest-step-in-the-russian-led-destruction-of-the-syrian-revolution/

(Continued from part 1)


Did Trump also green-light Assad?

It is no surprise that Trump immediately tweeted that the Russia-Turkey 
agreement was “good news”. It may be conspiratorial to suggest that 
Trump’s withdrawal was part of the Putin-led plan, given Trump’s 
tendency to make policy decisions over a phone-call. But remove the idea 
of subjective intention: Trump’s move is consistent with a not uncommon 
view that there are no fundamental US interests in Syria; supporting 
oppressive regimes rolling over the oppressed is consistent with US 
policy and interests in countless other places (eg Palestine); patching 
it up with a big NATO state is ultimately in US interests; and this move 
is consistent with Trump’s repeated view that it is Assad’s 
counterrevolution to deal with, that the US should support Assad and 
Putin “fighting ISIS” (sic) and so on.

Trump was explicit, tweeting “Let Syria and Assad protect the Kurds and 
fight Turkey for their own land … Anyone who wants to assist Syria in 
protecting the Kurds is good with me, whether it is Russia, China, or 
Napoleon Bonaparte. I hope they all do great, we are 7,000 miles away!” 
Which is similar to what he tweeted last year when he announced 
“withdrawal”: “Russia, Iran, Syria & others are the local enemy of ISIS. 
We were doing there (sic) work.”

According to SDF commander Mazloum Kobani, Trump also greenlighted the 
SDF-Assad deal: “We told (Trump) that we are contacting the Syrian 
regime and the Russians in order to protect our country and land. He 
said, ‘We are not against that. We support that.”

There is no mystery here – US imperialism never attempted to unseat 
Assad despite trenchant myths. The US entered Syria’s war to support the 
YPG/SDF as their ground force against ISIS. With ISIS largely defeated, 
US imperialism has no fundamental reason to continue keeping some Syrian 
territory outside Assad’s control. While Trump’s policy is not the 
current policy of the US ruling-class mainstream (though there are 
exceptions, and this article claims a number of “pro-Turkey” advisors 
have entered the White House), it is conceivably one consistent choice 
for US imperialism.

When Trump first announced “withdrawal” in late 2018, I wrote that this 
was in effect going to be more of a greenlight to Assad than to Erdogan:

“ … while almost every analyst claimed this move was a sell-out of the 
US-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to the Erdogan 
regime in Turkey … it was just as much, if not more, a green light for 
the Bashar Assad tyranny to take control of the SDF-controlled regions.

“However, some clarification may be in order: how can a US withdrawal 
favour Assad and Russia if the US presence in Syria was never opposed to 
them in the first place? Here we need to understand the US relationship 
with its ground ally, the SDF, which controls northeast Syria since 
driving out ISIS …

“ … the US and SDF [fought] ISIS in the east in a war completely 
separate to Assad’s counterrevolutionary war against the rebellion in 
western Syria. But while the SDF was not anti-Assad, nor was it 
pro-Assad; it was interested in building its own project, the ‘Rojava 
revolution’, separate to both Assad and the rebels. Therefore, the US 
was maintaining a region outside Assad’s direct control; but this was 
never the ultimate US aim, which was merely to use the SDF to defeat 
ISIS. Therefore, the current processes of the US abandoning the SDF to 
Assad, and the SDF itself trying to negotiate a deal with Assad, are 
essentially in harmony, but in these “negotiations” it is the regime, 
not the Rojava project, that will come out on top.”


Mainstream of US ruling-class furious

Most representatives of the US ruling-class – from the Pentagon through 
the Democratic Party and most of the Republican Party, from liberal 
doves to hard-nosed realists to unreconstructed neoconservatives, from 
the New York Times to the Wall Street Journal – furiously opposed 
Trump’s move. Defence Secretary Mark Esper openly declared Turkey to not 
be an ally; former Trump government hard-interventionist Nikki Haley 
created the twitter handle #TurkeyIsNotOurFriend. A joint 
Republican-Democratic team led by Trump ally Lindsay Graham has crafted 
a harsh sanctions bill against Turkey.

They believe it is in US interests to hang on to the SDF statelet in 
eastern Syria for longer, whether purely as a buffer against Iran (the 
Bolton view), or as a medium for pressuring Assad regarding the 
political process (while the US has always excelled at supporting 
tyrants, most recognise that Assad’s military victories are incapable of 
re-establishing any real stability and therefore support the UN-led 
“constitutional” process to broaden the Assad regime), or because 
precipitous withdrawal is massively damaging to US imperial credibility 
and threatens to undo five years of US military-political success in the 
region. However, none of this is really about love of “the Kurds” or the 
Rojava project and there should be little doubt that betrayal would have 
arrived sometime later.

As this article goes to press, this fury with Trump’s decision may be 
leading to a new tactic in managing the crisis it caused. Trump is 
alleged to now be in favour of keeping some 200 troops in Syria near the 
Iraqi border to bomb ISIS, but also to, as Trump tweeted, “secure the 
oil,” ie, some SDF-controlled oil wealth. This has apparently swung 
Lindsay Graham, who explains that “I believe we’re on the verge of a 
joint venture between us and the Syrian Democratic Forces … to modernize 
the oil fields and make sure they get the revenue.” Others suggest that 
the oil idea is just a ploy for the Pentagon to sell to Trump their 
desire to remain to keep bombing ISIS.


Turkey’s plan to drive refugees into Syria

Yet while Turkey has unequivocally declared its acceptance of the Assad 
regime taking control of SDF territories, the deal will not entirely 
satisfy Erdogan’s other stated objective: to dump some 2 million 
refugees into the “safe zone”. Perhaps Turkey can send some of its 
refugee population into the 100-kilometre section it has been allotted, 
as well as the region it already controls between Jarablus and Azaz, as 
well as occupied Kurdish Afrin.

As Firas Abdullah notes regarding this plan:

“This operation is coloured with racism and hateful speech, racism 
against the Kurdish Syrian civilians who are fleeing their cities 
because of the Turkish bombing now, and racism against the Syrians who 
are living in Turkey, and who are going to be deported to this territory 
after the operation is done according to the declarations from the 
Turkish side, so Turkey will get rid of over 1 or 2 million Syrians. 
Okay, what if I’m a Syrian from Homs and live in Istanbul? I’ll be 
deported to Hasakeh (after it’s been cleaned by the operation and 
destroyed).”

This campaign to dump Syrian refugees anywhere is driven just as much, 
if not more, by the Turkish opposition as by Erdogan’s AKP. In the 
2011-2015 period when the AKP was welcoming these refugees from Assad’s 
terror (and also engaging in a limited ‘peace process’ with the Turkish 
Kurds and the PKK), the opposition in Turkey raised the banner of 
Turkish nationalism against both Syrian Arab refugees and talks with 
Kurds. Both the Kemalist CHP and the Turko-fascist MHP long demanded the 
Syrian refugees be deported. But since 2015 the AKP has been in 
coalition with the MHP; and now the MHP, the CHP, and the MHP’s equally 
far-right split, the IYI, all support this invasion, hoping to expel the 
Syrian refugees.

However, the blame cannot be laid solely at Turkey’s feet. The Syrian 
catastrophe is a global problem where the world has failed the Syrian 
people; yet Turkey has taken the lion’s share of refugees, and for this 
should be commended. Europe has been paying to keep the refugees in 
Turkey and out of Europe; while the US and other western countries have 
accepted markedly few refugees. Turkey’s method of dealing with this is 
appalling, but many Turks, Arabs and Kurds can be excused for seeing 
only hypocrisy in Europe and the US.


Who are the ‘Turkish-backed rebels’?

While on the topic of Erdogan dumping Syrian refugees into the 
northeast, the question arises of who the Syrian ‘rebel’ groups fighting 
under the banner of the Turkish-controlled ‘Syrian National Army’ (SNA) 
are. From the discourse of the apologists, these are simply rebel groups 
based among these refugees leading them back to their homeland. Others 
have them as simply the same rebel groups that fought Assad, now trying 
to liberate new territory; or alternatively, who are now proxified by 
Turkey due to weakness. The main depiction in media reports is of a 
bunch of crazed killers. The reality probably covers the entire 
spectrum.

Regarding the first idea, while many of these ‘rebels’ have been 
recruited from among dispossessed Syrians, including ex-rebels, 
overwhelmingly they are not returnees to the region being conquered. 
However, in some cases they are; as noted above, some of the “rebels” 
entering Tal Abyad are likely from the Arab refugee population that was 
uprooted by the SDF in 2015.

On the second depiction, it is true that, to some extent, the presence 
of former branches of the FSA or other rebel groups is the result of the 
defeats of the revolution and increasing dependence on outside 
“sponsors” with their own interests (the SDF’s reliance on US 
imperialism and now the Assad regime are similar in this sense). Some 
may feel they have no choice but to fight for Turkey in the hope that 
the latter will continue to keep some areas out of regime control in 
return, especially as the rest of the world has long ago dropped any 
pretence of support. In reality, the presence of fighters in the 
northeast rather than in Idlib will just make it easier for Assad to mop 
up there. Their presence is also partly explained by the divisions 
between the largely Arab rebels and the Kurdish fighters noted above, in 
which actions by the YPG have played their own role. For example, in 
early 2016, the SDF conquered the rebel-held, Arab majority region of 
Tal Rifaat and northern Aleppo with the aid of Russian terror bombing; 
some think it is now alright to ‘get back at them’ or ‘pay their debt’ 
to Turkey.

But whatever the causes of proxification, it is essential to distinguish 
the so-called ‘Turkish-led Free Syrian Army’ (TFSA, as the SNA is often 
dubbed) with the actual FSA. The legitimacy of the FSA was not in any 
particular ideology, still less pureness, but rather the fact that it 
arose as the proud armed expression of the Syrian people’s uprising for 
freedom and democracy against the Assad dictatorship. Once divorced from 
that base among the revolutionary people, by defeat and/or dispossession 
and exile, these are just armed groups; whether or not they continue to 
advance a revolutionary cause depends entirely on context. The context 
here is their use by Turkey as shock troops for its anti-Kurdish goals, 
goals that have nothing to do with the original aims of the FSA.

Even if a group defending an Idlib town from Assad has the same name as 
a group invading northeast Syria, they have to be understood as 
different phenomena. Rebel brigades are local-based and defined; 
allegedly “national” groups do not operate like Leninist parties as some 
in the West may imagine.

On the third idea, being proxies does not make all the SNA fighters the 
sadistic killers that the media has highlighted. Nevertheless, the 
context of conquest does create the conditions for the savage crimes 
that have occurred and the more general tendency towards plunder, 
derived from their desperate and unhinged nature, the absence of 
connection to the region, the atmosphere of impunity and their complete 
dependence on Turkey.

In any case, even the actual names of the main groups involved in the 
Turkish-led invasion, especially those noted for the worst crimes, 
reveal they are far from being representative of the old FSA or rebel 
movement more generally.

For example, the group blamed for the worst crimes, Ahrar al-Sharqiyya, 
has its own history of violence against other rebel groups, and is a 
relatively new group, formed only in 2016 by exiled rebels from the Deir 
Ezzor region, who took part in Turkey’s 2016 Euphrates Shield operation 
to evict ISIS from the eastern Aleppo region. Therefore, it has no “FSA 
history” at all.

Another group is Jaysh al-Islam, which was a major non-FSA, Islamist 
rebel group in East Ghouta, expelled when Assad reconquered the region 
in 2018. Even when in East Ghouta, JaI regularly clashed with other 
rebels, was extremely oppressive, pathologically sectarian, and is 
widely suspected of the abduction and disappearance of the famous ‘Douma 
Four’ revolutionary activists. But if in East Ghouta it was still 
partially connected to the revolutionary masses resisting Assad (at 
least with respect to its foot soldiers), in exile in Turkey all that is 
left is the vile militia that revolutionary activists have already 
experienced.

A third major group is the Sultan Murad Brigade, which was originally 
simply a Turkmen branch of the FSA, but which has become heavily 
proxified by Turkey. Even if it hadn’t, the fact of Turkey sending an 
ethnic Turkmen brigade, based in the east Aleppo region, to invade 
Kurdish regions, is symbolic of the nature of this operation.

A final point: pro-Assad chameleon Rania Khalek has claimed that “The US 
armed and funded extremists in Syria to overthrow the Syrian government 
and … those same extremists then attacked the Kurds on Turkey’s behalf.” 
This is nonsense at every level, but this is not the place to go into 
the extremely limited US support for heavily vetted rebels with 
stringent conditions (mostly to drop the fight against Assad and turn 
their guns only on ISIS), which dried up years ago, before being 
officially ended by Trump. I’ve written about it here and here. However, 
groups such as Ahrar al-Shaqiyya and Jaysh al-Islam never got a cent or 
a gun from the US, let alone any “extremists” which the US spent years 
bombing; in fact, the only US connection to Ahrar al-Shaqiyya was when 
it bombed them in 2016.


Meanwhile, who cares about Idlib …

Meanwhile, while global attention has been focused on Turkey’s brutality 
in the northeast, Assad and Putin continue to bomb, kill and dispossess 
the mostly Arab population of greater Idlib in the northwest, a campaign 
replete with systematic destruction of hospitals and schools, despite 
yet another Putin-Erdogan deal in September for a demilitarised buffer 
zone in Idlib separating Assadist and rebel forces. Dozens were killed 
in Idlib during the ten days of Turkey’s operation, but their multi-year 
plight gathers no global interest.

More importantly, there is almost certainly a quid pro quo here – Putin 
greenlights Erdogan’s attack on the SDF in the northeast, sends armed 
refugees and fighters not from that region in to plunder it, rather than 
arming fighters and sending military support to the ongoing local 
resistance to Assad in the northwest. If Erdogan really cared about the 
rebellion, he could have poured in the resources – including fighters – 
to prevent Assad’s recent seizure of Khan Sheikhoun, for example. As 
Assad is now announcing a new “battle for Idlib” while Turkey distracts 
itself and thousands of ex-rebels elsewhere, this region will likely get 
eaten up, unless Erdogan can negotiate with Putin for a small strip 
along the border as another “safe zone” to prevent more Syrian refugees 
fleeing into Turkey.


Resistance in Deir-Ezzor?

Where the Assad-SDF deal could come unstuck is among the million-strong 
Arab population living in the ‘North Syria Federation’, the official 
name of the SDF-controlled region. While the SDF’s official 
multi-ethnicity appears to have been successful in some areas, this has 
greatly varied across the region. The PYD and YPG still hold effective 
political and military control behind the scenes of the elected 
multi-ethnic local bodies, often leading to serious tensions, even if 
most of the Arab population saw SDF rule as infinitely better than that 
of ISIS or the Assad regime.

In Raqqa and Deir Ezzor provinces, the Arab populations are extremely 
fearful of a return of the regime. On the one hand, Raqqa was so 
completely destroyed by US bombing in the eviction of ISIS that any 
echoes of its pre-ISIS revolutionary phase have probably been 
extinguished and the population so exhausted that any solution bringing 
stability may be grudgingly welcomed, although even here there are signs 
of protest. But the Arab population of Deir Ezzor, among the earliest to 
rise against Assad, will resist any attempt by Assad to retake the 
region. Before this current events, we saw both big protests against SDF 
rule, and, in the part of Deir Ezzor under Assad-Iran control, big 
protests demanding the SDF take control (ie, away from Assad), making 
clear who their main enemy is. There are already protests being launched 
throughout SDF-controlled Deir Ezzor and elsewhere in the northeast 
against the prospect of Assadist return. Meanwhile, even in Manbij there 
is resistance to the prospect of Assadist return, a general strike is 
being called.

This uprising going on throughout Deir Ezzor and elsewhere, combined 
with ongoing demonstrations against the Assad regime, and sometimes 
against HTS, in the rebel-held northwest, and ongoing feats of 
resistance even in Daraa where Assad has re-asserted control, also 
indicate it is still premature to declare the Syrian revolution dead. 
While Yassin al-Haj Saleh claims that “the Syrian revolution has come to 
an end” he continues  “but the Syrian Question has just begun” because 
“there is no other choice than to continue, to persist, but with 
different methods, other rhythms, basing ourselves on the lessons that 
the martyred and battered revolution has given us.”

This rising and ebbing of any such movement in Syria cannot be divorced 
from what happens in the region: the Syrian revolution was part of the 
Arab Spring revolution, and where this has been crushed, diverted or 
exhausted elsewhere in the region, it is no surprise that 
counterrevolution also has the upper hand in Syria. But even now, along 
with the mini-uprising in Deir Ezzor and ongoing resistance in Idlib, we 
have seen in recent weeks mass uprisings in Egypt and Iraq, and now in 
Lebanon, along with the uprisings in Algeria and Sudan earlier in the 
year. It’s not over.


Geopolitics and the politics of confusion

Finally, some points about the regional geopolitics of this event. While 
Marxist thinking aims for a materialist explanation of events based on 
real social forces, a kind of simpleton “leftism” has come to the fore 
in recent decades which sees itself as “anti-imperialist” and believes 
one can determine their view of events based on “who supports who.” So 
here’s a little outline for anyone who needs their fix.

First, the United States and Russia jointly vetoed a UN Security Council 
resolution put by Britain, France and Germany condemning the Turkish 
invasion.

Second, the US House of Representatives voted 354-60 to condemn Trump’s 
withdrawal and Turkey’s invasion.

Next, despite the Assad regime’s deal with the SDF, its real view of the 
SDF was summed up by Syria’s deputy foreign minister Faisal Maqdad, who 
stated that “We won’t accept any dialogue or talk with those who had 
become hostages to foreign forces” calling them “armed groups had 
betrayed their country and committed crimes against it.”

Not surprisingly, Benjamin Netanyahu stated that “Israel strongly 
condemns the Turkish invasion of the Kurdish areas in Syria and warns 
against the ethnic cleansing of the Kurds by Turkey and its proxies. 
Israel is prepared to extend humanitarian assistance to the gallant 
Kurdish people.”

Likewise, the enemies of the Turkey-Qatar-Muslim Brotherhood regional 
bloc, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt all vigorously 
condemned Turkey’s invasion. Saudi Arabia declared it “a threat to 
regional peace and security,” the UAE called it “a flagrant and 
unacceptable aggression against the sovereignty of a brotherly Arab 
state”, Egypt called it “blatant aggression” and called for the UN 
Security Council to halt “any attempts to occupy Syrian territories or 
change the demographics in northern Syria.”

Hope this checklist helps those who prefer ‘geopolitics’ to analysis.


Concluding remarks

While tons of ink has rightly been spread denouncing Trump for betrayal, 
there is no reason to be surprised; imperialist and regional powers look 
after their interests. Even though the majority of the US ruling class 
is opposed to the timing and manner of Trump’s actions, this is hardly a 
first, either for US betrayal of the Kurds – which occurred also in 1975 
and 1991 – or of other, including the Syrian people as a whole whom it 
falsely pretended to support.

Far too much ink has been spilt claiming the US is hereby betraying its 
own “ideals”. In reality, it is a rare case for the US (or any 
imperialist power) to be in the situation to be able to “betray” a 
rightful cause, because its normal position is on the other side. US 
imperialist “ideals” range from the decade-long genocide in Vietnam 
through the installation, arming and financing of the most vicious 
dictatorships across Latin America, Asia, the Middle East and Africa for 
decades to being the most consistent supporter and armer of Israel’s 
ongoing oppression, occupation, impunity and dispossession of the 
Palestinian people.

This should not be read as a criticism of the Kurdish people when they 
did rely on US aid to protect themselves from ISIS genocide in Kobane, 
just as Turkey’s vile actions today should not condemn the Syrian 
people, being bombed and tortured into oblivion by the world’s worst 
tyranny, gaining vital support over the years from Turkey. That is the 
real world; you get a lifeline from where you can. But the fact of 
different parts of the Syrian popular masses ending up in opposing camps 
and killing each other while being manipulated by different sponsoring 
powers intervening in Syria with their own interests, or by the fascist 
regime, is the bigger question that will need to be dealt with as part 
of the post-mortem of the Syrian revolution.