[Midden-Oosten] Trump leaves Syria: On ‘regime change’ and other tall stories

[Jeff]

Trump leaves Syria: On ‘regime change’ and other tall stories
December 21, 2018
by Michael Karadjis

https://mkaradjis.wordpress.com/2018/12/21/trump-leaves-syria-on-regime-change-and-other-tall-stories/

Trump’s sudden decision to get US forces out of Syria is a green-light 
to both Syrian tyrant Bashar Assad and Turkish ruler Erdogan to move 
into the northeastern part of Syria currently controlled by the (until 
now) US-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and of 
course also a nod towards the big ally of both Assad and Erdogan, 
Trump’s friends in Russia, who of course praised Trump’s decision. Of 
course, a US betrayal of its Kurdish allies was always a matter of time.

It should be noted that, while the Kurdish and other people living in 
the northeast will be the main group of victims, it should not be 
overlooked that US withdrawal will also hand tens of thousands of Syrian 
refugees in the Rukban camp on the Jordanian border will also be 
directly exposed to Assadist conquest, especially as Jordan refuses to 
take them. The US base at al-Tanf, where the US had armed some ex-rebel 
groups to fight ISIS, offered some protection to the camp residents, 
although the US and Jordan were no better at providing food than was the 
Assad regime, which engaged in its time-honoured tactic of the 
starvation siege.

It is no surprise that virtually none of the commentary on any side has 
had anything to say about the Assad regime; take this Washington Post 
editorial as an example, not a mention. Of course, the entire question 
of Assad is and always has been irrelevant to the question of the US 
either staying in or leaving Syria.

I suppose it is no coincidence that Trump’s order to withdraw comes a 
few days after his special envoy to Syria, Jim Jeffrey, declared that 
while the US wants to see a regime in Damascus that is “fundamentally 
different,” nevertheless, “it’s not regime change” the US is seeking, 
“we’re not trying to get rid of Assad.”

However, I say “I suppose” because it is not as if this is the first 
time the US declared it was not trying to get rid of Assad or carry out 
regime change. Those statements have been going on for years (especially 
under Trump, but also before). Of course, even before US leaders began 
declaring this openly, “removing Assad” was never the US policy at any 
time, that was only ever the figment of feverish alt-left and far-right 
imaginations, but let’s just focus on the open declarations, because the 
curious thing is that, on every such occasion, the media pumped out the 
same discourse of “surprise” and “policy reversal” and the US being “no 
longer” (!) focused on “regime change” (I wonder how many times you can 
“no longer” be doing something you’re already “no longer” doing?).

Here’s a few snippets:

*    In 2016, declaring that the US was “not seeking so-called regime 
change as it is known in Syria,” Obama’s Secretary of State John Kerry 
added that the US and Russia see the conflict “fundamentally very 
similarly.”
*    In March 2017, Trump’s UN representative, Nikki Haley, despite her 
own tendency to spout anti-Assad rhetoric, declared that the Trump 
administration was “no longer” focused on removing Assad “the way the 
previous administration was.”
*    The same month, Sean Spicer, the White House press secretary, noted 
that “The United States has profound priorities in Syria and Iraq, and 
we’ve made it clear that counterterrorism, particularly the defeat of 
ISIS, is foremost among those priorities. With respect to Assad, there 
is a political reality that we have to accept.”
*    In July 2017, then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson clarified that 
the only fight in Syria is with ISIS, that Assad’s future is Russia’s 
issue, and he essentially called the regime allies: “We call upon all 
parties, including the Syrian government and its allies, Syrian 
opposition forces, and Coalition forces carrying out the battle to 
defeat ISIS, to avoid conflict with one another …”
*    Following the one-off US strike on an empty Assadist air-base after 
Assad’s horrific chemical weapons attack on Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib, US 
National Security Advisor HR McMaster clarified that the US had no 
concern with the fact that the base was being used to bomb Syrians again 
the very next day, because harming Assad’s military capacities was not 
the aim of the strike; and far from “regime change”, the US desired a 
“change in the nature of the Assad regime and its behavior in 
particular.” [note: not a change in the nature of the regime, a change 
in the nature of the Assad regime].
*    Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s speech in January 2018 
focused on supporting the Geneva process for a “political solution,” but 
now the US no longer expected Assad to stand down at the beginning of a 
transition phase as under early Obama, or even at its end as under late 
Obama; rather, US policy was to wait for an eventual “free election” 
under Assad: “The United States believes that free and transparent 
elections … will result in the permanent departure of Assad and his 
family from power. This process will take time, and we urge patience in 
the departure of Assad and the establishment of new leadership.”
*    Even before his most recent, more blatant, statement, Jeffrey had 
already made a similar statement in his November 29 address to the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on Syria, declaring that the US was committed 
to a political process that “will change the nature and the behaviour of 
the Syrian government … this is not regime change, this is not related 
to personalities.”


Should I stay or should I go? Dispute within the US ruling class

Note that the arrival mid-year of Jeffrey was widely heralded as a 
“toughening up” of the Trump regime’s stance on Assad. In reality, it 
was only ever really about Iran; and was in full accord with the Israeli 
and now Gulf-state view of separating Assad from Iran by relying more on 
Assad’s other key ally, Russia.

And it is not only the idiosyncratic Trump, but the rational-sounding 
Jeffrey, that pushes this Russia line. When it comes to the change in 
“behaviour”, Jeffrey’s overwhelming stress was on the removal of all 
“Iranian-led” forces from Syria, which he assessed threaten “our friends 
in the region, principally Israel.” In contrast, Jeffrey states that 
“although our objectives and Russia’s are not aligned, we seek common 
ground with Russia in order to resolve the conflict in Syria” and called 
on Russia to “join efforts to counter Iran’s destabilizing actions and 
influence in Syria to remove all Iranian-commanded forces from the 
country.”

Indeed, the most vociferous anti-Iranian voice, National Security 
Advisor John Bolton, has always opposed removing Assad, believing this 
would lead to “al-Qaida” taking power. Hence the stance of those in the 
Pentagon and security apparatus opposed to withdrawal are not opposed 
because they want to stay to “topple Assad”, a completely laughable idea 
that none of them have ever suggested; rather, they want to stay as a 
block to Iranian influence.

Much of the commentary is declaring Trump some kind of traitor to “US 
interests” by selling out to both Iran and Russia in withdrawing. In my 
opinion, this is mistaken on both counts. There is also the accusation 
that he is selling out the US’ Kurdish allies, the YPG/SDF, whereas the 
“remainers” want to honour commitments to allies. However, the 
“remainers” (both Bolton and State Secretary Pompeo are understood to be 
in this camp) care no more about Kurds or anyone else than does Trump; 
but they want to make their deal with Russia/Assad first: ensuring 
Iranian-led forces are expelled from Syria, in exchange for the US 
allowing Assad to reconquer northeast Syria. A “Kurds for Iran” deal, 
similar to the US-Israel “rebels for Iran” deal with Assad in the south. 
As Jeffrey states, this deal includes Russia; the US has simply never at 
any stage of the conflict aimed at removing Russia from its leading 
position in Syria.

Trump, by contrast, is jumping ahead; yes Russia, Assad and Erdogan can 
gobble up the northeast, relying on an understanding he has with Russia 
(as do Israel and Saudi Arabia) that Russia’s own rivalry with Iran in 
Syria will lead to a Russian wall against Iranian influence; and that a 
more solidified Assad regime is in less and less need of the 
destabilising Iranian-backed rabble. And to the extent that Russia isn’t 
strong enough to do this alone, Israel has threatened to up its strikes 
on pro-Iranian forces in Syria; the current visit of Russian senators to 
Israel to discuss the “joint struggle against terrorism” seems part of 
this same process.

Of course, there is also the issue of whether or not ISIS has been 
defeated, as Trump claims. Much commentary says this is not so, that 
Trump is allowing ISIS to return. In reality, the US-SDF alliance has 
driven ISIS almost entirely out of Syria, other than a tiny remaining 
pocket. Trump always said the only reason to be in Syria was to defeat 
ISIS, and on this he is largely correct; moreover, there is no other 
legal mandate for the US to be in Syria. In announcing withdrawal, Trump 
tweeted that “Russia, Iran, Syria & others are the local enemy of ISIS. 
We were doing there (sic) work.” While some may interpret this in 
conspiracist terms, that he wants to bog them down in the fight against 
ISIS, Russia’s welcome of the announcement belies this interpretation; 
what Trump means is that Assad now has the go-ahead to seize the rest of 
Deir Ezzor region from the SDF in order for his regime to complete the 
“fight against ISIS” there, ie, to consolidate his victorious 
counterrevolution over Syria.


Proxification and Betrayal

There is little doubt that the SDF is being betrayed by Trump, and would 
eventually have been by the “remainers” as well. One possibility however 
is of the SDF following the same path; after all, the basis of the 
US-SDF alliance against ISIS was that both the US and the SDF had a 
neutral policy towards the main war in Syria, between the Assad regime 
and the rebels. If the US can accommodate Assad, so can the SDF. 
However. There is a major difference in power here. While the SDF 
leadership has made moves in this direction, they are likely to get 
little; Assad is powerful now, having largely defeated the opposition; 
therefore, his regime has no reason to concede anything. Assad may 
temporarily agree to a deal with the SDF to stave off Turkey (Assad is 
less enamoured of Erdogan than his Russian and Iranian allies are), but 
the conditions for such an alliance will involve such a complete 
reduction in autonomy to figleaf status that the SDF could not agree 
without liquidating its cause.

Both the SDF and the Kurdish populations must be defended against any 
pending Erdogan/Assad assault. Supporters of the SDF project, however, 
need to reckon with the historic betrayals of the YPG/SDF leadership, 
which cut the Kurdish populations off from the rest of the revolutionary 
process, and at times directly attacked the revolution in collaboration 
with Assad and Russia, especially during the SDF’s 
Russian-airforce-backed attack on the rebels in the Arab-majority 
northern Aleppo/Tal Rifaat region in early 2016, and its subsequent aid 
to Assad’s final assault on rebel-held Aleppo.

These short-sighted (to put it mildly!) policies have led to the 
isolation of the SDF, and the Kurdish people, in their hour of need. For 
example, many of the rebel troops that took part in Turkey’s bloody 
invasion of Kurdish Afrin (Operation ‘Olive Branch’) early this year 
were former residents of the Tal Rifaat region who had been uprooted in 
the SDF’s own Russian-backed version of ‘Olive Branch’ two years 
earlier.

This has now led to rebel promises of participation in the threatened 
Turkish invasion of the northeast. While there may be some regions of 
Arab majority that welcome an FSA entry – something that cannot be 
determined merely by ethnic composition, but only if we see attempted 
uprisings against Rojava authorities – overwhelmingly this invasion is 
likely to be resisted, turning whichever rebel groups take part into an 
army of occupation, like in Afrin. This is especially the case if Turkey 
and any rebel allies invade the actual Kurdish-majority regions.

The fact that the SDF has done the same makes no difference; years of 
bloody counterrevolution by an overwhelmingly military dominant regime, 
backed by massive foreign intervention and otherwise international 
indifference, has partially proxified both the main Arab and Kurdish 
leaderships. It may often have seemed like they had “no choice,” and it 
is very difficult to criticise from afar. Really, who can blame the 
rebels for their alliance with Turkey when Turkey almost alone in the 
world was willing to provide some support to the people facing genocide, 
along with accommodating 3.7 million Syrian refugees, by far the biggest 
population in the world? Who can blame the SDF for allying with the US 
against such a monstrous enemy as ISIS, especially when faced with 
extinction in Kobane?

However, the hard reality is that the resulting division between the 
Arab and Kurdish populations outside Assadist control is the death-knell 
of both, leading them into further dependence on, and the threat of 
abandonment by, foreign interests, to the benefit only of the regime.

Moreover, it is unlikely that Putin and Assad will give Erdogan the 
go-ahead to attack the SDF in northeastern Syria without some quid pro 
quo in the northwest, ie rebel-controlled Greater Idlib. Probably not 
all of it just yet – neither Turkey nor the West can agree to a total 
Assadist reconquest that would send hundreds of thousands more refugees 
across borders – but possibly allowing Assad to gobble up enough of 
southern Idlib to ensure control of the main thoroughfares between 
Aleppo and Latakia, which would mean wiping out some key revolutionary 
centres. It would be the ultimate irony to watch rebel (or ex-rebel) 
troops attacking the SDF in the northeast as part of a Turkish operation 
while Assad and Russia further slice into the last part of free Syria in 
the northwest.


The bankruptcy of “anti-imperialism”

It is somewhat surreal to watch countless “anti-imperialists” denounce 
Trump’s “betrayal” of the Kurds to Turkey (they tend to not be so loud 
about the betrayal to Assad), while other “anti-imperialists” applaud 
Trump’s move as a step towards something they call a “peace process”. 
How to explain such dissonance?

Throughout the last 8 years, the Manichean version of “anti-imperialism” 
spouted by an alt-left and far-right convergence has given support to a 
reactionary genocidal tyrant destroying his entire country to squash a 
popular uprising on the false altar of opposing “US-backed regime 
change” and the like.

The fact that there was never any US “regime-change” operation was 
irrelevant, as were most facts; while the Kurdish-led SDF has received 
over 4 years of US air power at their service, which has killed 
thousands of civilians, while the Syrian rebels never received any such 
support (indeed, they have often enough been bombed by US warplanes); 
while the SDF was blessed with the support of thousands of US troops 
(who are now being withdrawn), there was never a single US troop in 
support of the rebels; while there are a dozen or so US bases in 
SDF-controlled Rojava there are none in any rebel-controlled zone; while 
the US ensured key Kurdish centres such as Kobane did not fall, no 
rebel-held centre, whether overrun by Assad or even by ISIS, ever 
received such defence. Yet for most “anti-imperialists”, the rebels were 
still the “US proxies” while the SDF were brave “anti-imperialist” 
fighters. It is difficult to explain how it was possible to reverse 
reality in such a total way; part of it was perhaps the YPG’s connection 
to the PKK in Turkey, given its ancient anti-imperialist history from 
another era, among other psychological motivations.

What to say then when the US withdraws? Praise the end of “imperialist 
intervention”? Or protest the betrayal of the Kurds, meaning, perhaps, 
the dreaded “US intervention” should continue? How ironic that it is 
often (of course, not always) the same people attempting to say both 
things. But while there are many confused anti-Assad people stuck in 
this quandary, in too many cases, this “anti-imperialism” involved those 
who wanted to be “anti-imperialist” as long as it meant scabbing on the 
Syrian people’s uprising and supporting the most tyrannical oligarchic 
dictatorship of the 21st century; every tiny hint of US support to the 
rebels was denounced as evidence of “regime change”. Yet once it became 
clear that the US saw its key ally in Syria as the SDF, many went 
silent; four years of massive US bombing of ISIS (and also of Nusra and 
sometimes even the rebels), killing anywhere between 4800 and 13,500 
civilians, has largely been met with embarrassed silence by the 
“anti-war” movement around the world, while the abstract trope of 
“opposing US intervention” is still kept in the cupboard in case it 
needs to be occasionally dusted off, to protest the odd one-off US 
strike on some empty Assad airbase, that kills nobody at all, when Assad 
indulges in chemical warfare.

In recent weeks and months, US air-borne terror has been increasing. In 
mid-December, US airstrikes hit a mosque in Syria, killing 17 people. 
The response? Deafening silence. Between US terror from the skies and a 
monstrous regime like that of ISIS, it is better to admit there is an 
ethical dilemma, rather than be so certain you are “against 
intervention”, especially when for the most part you are actually not 
against it at all. And you ought to also be consistent in relation to 
the imaginary, never-existing “threat” of US intervention against Assad, 
whose regime has killed about 100 times more people than ISIS could ever 
manage, and admit that the main role of this particular version of 
“anti-imperialism” – the anti-solidarity version – over the last 8 years 
has been that of scabbery on the Syrian people.

The debate in US imperialist circles between staying in Syria or 
quitting Syria is not one with a more progressive side; in this case, 
Trump’s withdrawal is for entirely reactionary reasons.