[Midden-Oosten] Syria’s shock doctrine, by Leila Al Shami

Jeff meisner op xs4all.nl
Wo Apr 25 18:54:56 CEST 2018


Related:

Creating a New Syria: Property, Dispossession, and Regime Survival
by Erwin van Veen
Syria Comment April 15th, 2018
https://www.joshualandis.com/blog/creating-a-new-syria-property-dispossession-and-regime-survival-by-erwin-van-veen/

Displaced Syrians ensnared by new property law stand to lose everything
by Bahira al-Zarier and Barrett Limoges
Syria Direct Apr. 17, 2018
http://syriadirect.org/news/displaced-syrians-ensnared-by-new-property-law-stand-to-lose-everything/

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Syria’s shock doctrine
April 25, 2018 by Leila Al Shami
https://leilashami.wordpress.com/2018/04/25/syrias-shock-doctrine/

This was originally published
in Al-Jumhuriya. It’s available
in Spanish at Flores en Daraya.

After seven years of repression and war, more than half the Syrian 
population no longer live in their own homes. Most are internally 
displaced, but nearly six million have fled the country altogether in 
search of asylum. They dream of one day returning to their homes, but a 
new law means that many may never be able to.

On the 2 April, Law No. 10 was issued by the Syrian regime.[1] The law 
authorizes the formation of new local administrative units 
(governorates, cities, and towns) tasked with registering property 
ownership within their area of jurisdiction. Private property owners are 
then given thirty days to register and provide proof of ownership. 
Failure to do so will result in the property’s confiscation by the state 
without compensation.

The regime has presented this law as a means by which to re-develop 
informal slum areas and areas damaged by war. Yet it’s expected to 
disproportionately target communities once held by rebels, from which 
the residents have been displaced, in order to prevent their return. 
These informal working class city suburbs (as well as disadvantaged 
rural areas) have been hotbeds of resistance, and have therefore been 
pulverised by the regime’s relentless aerial assault.

Many displaced Syrians are fearful to return to areas under regime 
control. Registering their property is dependent on security clearance. 
There have been numerous reports in recent months of returnees suffering 
arrest, torture or forced conscription. Last month a pro-opposition news 
site released a database of 1.5 million Syrians wanted by the 
intelligence services.[2] The list dates from 2015, so is likely to have 
increased in size since. Relatives of those on the list may also face 
danger. The regime has a history of enacting its retribution on family 
members of perceived dissidents. Some property owners may currently be 
in prison, killed or disappeared.

Even for those willing to take the risk of returning, obstacles remain. 
Many homes were built without permits as urban areas rapidly expanded in 
recent decades and corrupt officials were always ready to turn a blind 
eye for a bribe. Many of those who built or bought their homes legally 
no longer possess documents. There are reports of the destruction of 
property records by regime forces in a number of areas returned to the 
state’s control. For example, in July 2013 the land registry in Homs 
burnt to the ground, in what was seen as a deliberate attack. There are 
similar reports from Zabadani, Darayya, and Qusayr.[3] And many people 
fled their communities without taking property deeds or other forms of 
civil documentation (such as proof of births, deaths and marriages), or 
have been unable to register these in exile.

Law No. 10 is seen by many as the regime’s attempt to implement 
demographic change. It’s been widely compared to Israel’s Absentee 
Property Law (1950) which legalized the seizure of property from 
Palestinians driven from their homes, transferring it to Israeli 
ownership. In this case the state wants to transfer property away from 
communities it will never be able to rule through consent, into the 
hands of loyalists.

Time and again entire communities which rebelled against the state have 
been subjected to forced population transfers. It’s happened in Madaya, 
Zabadani, Darayya, Moadamiyya, eastern Aleppo and now in the eastern 
Ghouta, where tens of thousands have been evicted. All cases follow a 
similar pattern: the rebellious community is subjected to a siege which 
prevents the entry of food and medical supplies; it is relentlessly 
bombed from the air with residential areas, agricultural land (where it 
exists) and vital civilian infrastructure deliberately targeted. The 
starving and traumatized population, which may have resisted for years, 
is finally given the ultimatum – surrender or face annihilation. Forced 
capitulation deals are then accompanied by forced population transfers; 
a war crime and crime against humanity. Law No. 10 is part two of the 
displacement story, the part that ensures the displacement is permanent.

In some cases the houses of those forced out have already been 
demolished. In 2014 Human Rights Watch reported on unauthorized 
demolitions being carried out on thousands of homes in opposition 
strongholds of Damascus and Hama, effectively erasing entire 
neighbourhoods from the map.[4] In some areas the homes of those 
forcibly evicted have been turned over to regime loyalists. This 
practice often has a sectarian dimension. Opposition communities largely 
comprise Sunni Muslims, whereas many minority communities have stayed 
loyal to the regime. When Old Homs was cleansed of its inhabitants in 
2014, reports emerged of Alawi and Shia loyalists from nearby villages 
being moved into vacant Sunni homes.[5] Foreign settlers are also moving 
in. There are reports of property being handed to Iranian-backed Shia 
militants and their families from Iraq and Lebanon.[6] There are reports 
too of record falsification, enabling the transfer of property to new 
owners. The new law stipulates that in the absence of property ownership 
documents a claimant can still apply if they possess an official 
identity document or passport. Recent (unconfirmed) reports claim that 
the regime has issued thousands of Syrian passports to Iranian, Afghan 
and Pakistani fighters.[7]

In a 2015 speech, Assad declared “Syria is not for those who hold its 
passport or reside in it; Syria is for those who defend it.” Through the 
transfer of property into loyalist hands, the regime is developing facts 
on the ground, ensuring its stronghold in areas it desires for its 
future rump state. Both the Iranian state and Iranian property 
developers are reportedly purchasing land around the capital and Homs. 
Iran hopes its companies will benefit from the future reconstruction 
drive and has strategic interests too in acquiring land, particularly in 
the Qalamoun Mountains along the Lebanese border to ensure a connection 
to its client Hizbullah.[8]

The country’s reconstruction drive — estimated as requiring more than US 
$ 250 billion — will be the arena through which the regime rewards its 
allies. The regime has always bestowed patronage for loyalty, practising 
ruthless crony capitalism, and reconstruction will allow it to further 
entrench its political and economic power base. In May 2015, Decree 
No.19 was issued. This granted local administrative units the power to 
establish holding companies to carry out reconstruction work and manage 
properties on their behalf exempt from taxes.[9] Through partnership 
with private investors and contractors, these holdings will manage real 
estate development. This basically facilitates the transfer of public 
assets and expropriated property to private business.

The model is already being implemented. In 2012, Decree No.66 — 
considered a precursor to the current law — paved the way for the 
expropriation of property in two informal areas of Damascus, (the 
Basateen Mezzeh district and an area reaching from Qadam to Darayya in 
the south). Residents were evicted and given paltry compensation. It’s 
been billed as a gentrification project to “redevelop areas of 
unauthorized housing and informal settlements” and turn them over to 
high-end residential housing, malls and parks. The 
governorate-established Damascus Cham Private Joint Stock Company is to 
lead the development, with starting capital of around US$120 
million.[10] The Aman Group, owned by regime crony Samer Foz, which 
works in real estate and the food sector, is a partner. The son of a 
close Sunni ally of Hafez Al Assad, he’s become one of the most powerful 
businessmen in the country over the course of the war.[11] Whilst many 
who have benefited from this regime hail from Assad’s extended family 
and sections of the Alawi sect to which he belongs, the regime has long 
courted the support of the Sunni business community, who in turn 
benefited from Bashar Al Assad’s neoliberal economic reforms and 
increasing drive towards privatization.[12]

Another person set to benefit from these projects is Assad’s cousin, 
Rami Makhlouf.[13] He was once estimated as controlling around sixty per 
cent of the economy through his multiple business interests and his 
personal wealth is estimated at billions of dollars. In the early days 
of the uprising many chants were directed against him by the populace he 
and his friends impoverished. They called for social justice and an end 
to corruption, as well as political freedoms.

Similarly, in Homs, a plan has been announced to redevelop areas 
destroyed by the regime, including the former rebellious neighbourhoods 
of Baba Amr and Jobar. In actuality the regime is reviving the ‘Homs 
Dream Project’ which caused evictions prior to 2011 but was subsequently 
abandoned due to local opposition. Dubbed the ‘Homs Nightmare’ by 
locals, its vision is to re-develop Sunni areas with glass fronted 
skyscrapers, restaurants, and shopping malls. These areas in the city 
centre have been disproportionately targeted by bombing despite 
presenting no significant military value.[14] A report by the Syria 
Institute and PAX stated the aim of the project is “the redistribution 
of the population to strengthen the physical control of the city by the 
pro-government Alawite community.”[15] Law No.10 now means that similar 
plans will be put into motion throughout the country in the hope that 
both funds and stability materialise.

Foreign direct investment will be needed to respond to the huge 
reconstruction needs. Entire cities have been turned to wastelands. The 
countries likely to benefit are regime allies, such as Russia, Iran, and 
China, who were invited to last year’s International Trade Fair in 
Damascus. These countries won’t condition their aid on human rights or 
political reforms. Regime figures have already stated that European and 
American companies will not benefit unless their governments apologize 
for their opposition to the regime.[16] Essentially reconstruction 
efforts will enrich regime figures and allies who are responsible for 
the country’s destruction while cementing the power of the Assad family 
and business elite.

In 2011 the Syrian people called for freedom, dignity and social 
justice. None of their demands were met. They were brutalized, and 
millions were driven from their homes. Now the question is: how many 
will have homes to return to? What does ‘home’ mean anyway when their 
country is re-built in the image of their tormentor?


[1] Law No. 10 (2018) in Arabic  https://bit.ly/2qIRGci

[2] Zaman Al Wasl, ‘Third Batch of Assad’s Wanted List Released: Check 
Your Name’, 25 March 2018, https://bit.ly/2HL4I07

[3] Martin Chulov, ‘Iran repopulates Syria with Shia Muslims to help 
tighten regime’s control’, The Guardian, 14 January 2017, 
https://bit.ly/2ju0tcX

[4] Human Rights Watch, ‘Razed to the ground: Syria’s unlawful 
neighborhood demolitions 2012-2013’, (2014) https://bit.ly/2dicDW9

[5] The Syrian Observer, ‘ Regime Endorses Siezure of Property in Homs 
by Shiites and Alawis’, 10 April 2015 https://bit.ly/2qJlXH3

[6] Martin Chulov, as above.

[7] Zaman Al Wasal, ‘Damascus immigration provides 200,000 passports for 
Iranian people’, 2 April 2018, in Arabic https://bit.ly/2IoBGCs

[8] Jihad Yazigi, Deconstruct to Reconstruct: How the Syrian Regime 
Capitalises on Property Destruction and Land Legislation, The Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation, July 2017, https://bit.ly/2HcjrA3

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Joseph Daher, ‘Assad regime still reliant on factions of the Sunni 
bourgeoisie’, Syria Untold, 21 December 2017, https://bit.ly/2J9hlSe

[12] Ibid.

[13] Enab Baladi, ‘Alliance of Companies Monopolizes New Damascus 
Development Organizations’, Syrian Observer, 6 April 2018, 
https://bit.ly/2J6Lth0

[14] Sarah Najm Aldeen et al. ‘In Homs Assad accused of using military 
for urban planning scheme’, Syria Deeply, 2 January 2018, 
https://bit.ly/2qKTzEl

[15] The Syria Institute and PAX, No Return to Homs: A case study in 
demographic engineering in Syria, (2017) https://bit.ly/2vrVq6L

[16] Joseph Daher, ‘Militias and crony capitalism to hamper Syria 
reconstruction’, Open Democracy, 5 September 2015, 
https://bit.ly/2HKSYe5





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